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Introduction: What Does Equality Mean to Nice White Parents?
The School for International Studies (SIS) is an innovative public school in
Brooklyn, New York. In 2015, most SIS students were drawn from poor or
working-class Black, Latino, and Middle Eastern families. However, in the last few
years, white parents with liberal values have begun sending their children to this
school out of a well-intentioned rejection of the de facto segregation in the schools
their children previously unattended. The recent New York Times podcast "Nice
White Parents" picks up the story from there, detailing the controversies that
emerged almost immediately.1
In the very first episode of the podcast, one of the white fathers, Rob
Hansen, grows frustrated with the inefficiencies of the PTA and its lack of
fundraising prowess, and he decides to draw on his professional background and
networks to create a foundation to solicit donor money. As it happens, Rob and
several of the other white families want their kids to learn French (not, we gather,
because of any ethnic ties to France), and they decide that the foundation should
focus its fundraising specifically on building a French language program at the
school. While this program is open to all students, the PTA is frustrated because
they recognize it is an initiative explicitly catering to the desires of the white parents
who want their children to have an advantage in college applications. In addition,
many of the parents argue that the money being raised should go toward updating
school infrastructure or other aims that more directly benefit everyone.
I am guessing that regardless of what one thinks about SIS's situation, no
one feels indifferent when hearing this story. But let me see if I can be more precise
in my estimation at how the various reactions correlate with political views. Let's
start with the assumption that, generally speaking, while the political Right
(especially in its most libertarian forms) would likely argue that there is no problem
at all, the political Left is united in seeing this as a problem. Let me further speculate
that the Left is divided on what exactly the primary problem is and how best to
address it.
In contemporary explorations of equity, we can understand the Left’s
framing of justice issues in terms of the late political theorist John Rawls’
foundational works on justice. In our post-Rawlsian context, the Left typically
frames justice issues in terms of equality of opportunity or equality of outcome.2
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Rawls is a compelling figure in my argument because he does not fit squarely within either
conception. Indeed he furnishes explicit arguments against both conceptions - arguing that neither
can fully overcome the issue of natural and social contingency. Nevertheless, his difference
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We might imagine the opportunity theorists identifying the school's problem as
inequity as it pertains to which students access which material resources. Framed
in this way, the obvious solution is to redistribute the money coming in from the
foundation in a manner that more obviously benefits all the students equally. On
the other hand, the outcome theorists say the problem is simply that some students
gain an edge over the other students through the specialized French course, and the
solution is thus to either continually increase the number of students taking French
or to abolish the class altogether.
I begin this essay on public policy considering this podcast because the
issues at this school are a microcosm of today's most passionate debates,
particularly within the Left. At risk of painting with too broad a brush, let's say that
today's neoliberals focus on outcomes, advocating for affirmative action and quotas
as a way of reassuring themselves that so long as a steady handful of intelligent
students from underprivileged backgrounds are joining the ranks of the elite then
justice is being served overall.3 On the other hand, social democrats (defined here
as proponents of expansive social welfare within the broader capitalist structure)
and socialists instead insist on better redistributions of material resources,
particularly since they are focused less on racial barriers and more focused on class
warfare.
The crux of my argument in this paper requires a rejection of the idea that
either framework, equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, serves as a good
starting place for defining the problem central to the school or seeking to address
that problem. And just as the case study opens into a larger consideration of public
policy debates, my argument also takes a wide view of present affairs. I will argue
that the primary problem facing the school and American society more broadly is
the artificial narrowing of who constitutes the public and the exclusion of those who
lack technocratic expertise from the democratic process. I will then argue for a
robust view of citizenship that advocates for widespread participation in public
affairs.

The Critique of Neoliberal Meritocracy:
To begin, let us leave the school for now, and think critically about the neoliberal
opportunity theorists. These theorists are concerned primarily with consistent and
principle articulated crudely as a rising tide lifting all boats is focused on outcomes and so I
tentatively group him with the outcome theorists with plenty of important caveats. (See pgs. 7180.)
3
More broadly, this view is focused on social mobility as the primary measure of progress.

sufficient mobility as the metric for establishing equality. 4 In this regard, these
theorists adopt a variation of Rawls' difference principle inasmuch as it is
understood by these theorists that a situation with both inequality and the accessible
promise of mobility into a better life is preferable to an equality of situation wherein
everyone's situation is of a decidedly lower quality of life. 5 Nevertheless, Rawls
parts ways with opportunity theorists in establishing as a further condition that the
advantages drawn by those with greater success are justifiable only if the socially
advantaged improve the quality of life of those not advantaged beyond what it
would be if everyone had an equal situation. In other words, Rawls insists that the
rising tide must lift all boats, while the opportunity theorists merely insist that there
be steady mobility into the rising boats by those who are otherwise sinking.6 This
careful distinction separates the ideal Rawlsian society from the meritocracy we
currently inhabit, which Rawls severely critiques.
Rawls positions meritocracy as a social order that "uses equality of
opportunity as a way of releasing men's energies in the pursuit of economic
prosperity and political dominion."7 In this order, "there exists a marked disparity
between the upper and lower classes in both means of life and the rights and
privileges of organizational authority."8 Ultimately, in such a system, "the culture
of the poorer strata is impoverished while that of the governing and technocratic
elite is securely based on the service of the national ends of power and wealth."9
The crucial insight in all of this is that absent any corrective force, stark divides in
outcomes will emerge which can threaten the preservation of the democratic state.
It is important to note that Rawls' critique is emphatically not purely
materialistic. Instead, in his critique of the sharp social division between the
meritocratic winners and losers, he writes that the losers are justified in their revolt
against the elites not simply because they were excluded from the wealth and
privilege attached to the elites' roles, but more fundamentally "because they were
disbarred from experiencing the realization of self which comes from a skillful and
devoted exercise of social duties," a deprivation of "one of the main forms of human
good."10 The point to underscore here is that for Rawls, this widening inequality in
opportunity inhibits the full realization of a just society.
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After all, the alternative to this is a leveling of situations which ultimately represents the
priorities of the outcome theorists.
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While Rawls can get us started critiquing opportunity theorists and the
meritocracy they produce, the late social theorist Christopher Lasch provides the
visceral bite to this critique. Lasch has many indictments of the meritocratic elite.
First, they tend to find success at the price of detaching from their community of
origin: "from the professional and managerial point of view, neighborhoods are
places in which the unenterprising are left behind - backwaters of failure and
cultural stagnation."11 Similarly to Rawls, Lasch recognizes that this kind of
geographic sorting "drains talent away from the lower classes and thus deprives
them of effective leadership" (not to mention access to much-needed capital.)12
Second, this new "aristocracy of brains," given its lack of rootedness, produces
aristocrats who give their allegiance to the flow of capital in global markets,
"turning their back on the heartland and cultivating ties with the international
market in the fast-moving money, glamour, fashion, and popular culture."13 Third,
in addition to being themselves unrooted, these elites actively participate in the
uprooting of whatever city they happen to dwell in, remaking the city "as a place
merely to work and play, not as a place to put down roots, to raise children, to live
and die."14 Fourth, as a direct byproduct of this geographic concentration of the
elites, positions of influence are also consolidated and have added barriers of entry
as "the circles of power - finance, government, art, entertainment - overlap and
become increasingly interchangeable."15 Fifth, and finally, the elites who have been
taught that they are the deserving and valued members of society really do absorb
this message and consequently learn to look down on everyone else: long before
Hillary Clinton was dismissing half of America as a "basket of deplorables," Lasch
was writing of the "the venomous hatred that lies not far beneath the smiling face
of upper-middle-class benevolence."16
Lasch's scathing portrait of the meritocratic elite is the necessary foundation
for understanding his diagnosis of the patterns of disinvestment and disrepair that
mark the places and people abandoned in the meritocratic social Darwinist system.
Notice then that in the substantive and evergreen passage I quote below, most
neoliberals can certainly affirm the crisis that Lasch identifies. Still, they rarely can
see how they are implicated in it, and they certainly cannot conceive of any lasting
solutions to it. Lasch writes:
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The same pattern of development has been repeated in one city after
another, with the same discouraging results. The flight of population to the
suburbs, followed by the flight of industry and jobs, has left our cities
destitute. As the tax base shrivels, public services and civic amenities
disappear. Attempts to revive the city by constructing convention centers
and sports facilities designed to attract tourists merely heighten the contrast
between wealth and poverty. The city becomes a bazaar, but the luxuries on
display in its exclusive boutiques, hotels, and restaurants are beyond the
reach of most of the residents.17
As with Rawls, Lasch's objection to meritocracy is not merely materialistic. Instead,
he too is concerned with the effects of meritocracy on the democratic ideal. For
example, even in the description of the effects of neoliberal policy quoted above,
Lasch is not concerned primarily with income disparity as much as he is concerned
that the end product is the loss of civic participation as abandoned communities are
drained of resources for civic life on the one hand, and elite cities are transformed
into "a sprawling amorphous conglomeration without clearly identifiable
boundaries, public space, or civic identity, "on the other.18 Similarly, Lasch is
concerned with how the talent siphoning and power consolidation inherent to
meritocracy undermine the democratic ideal of each citizen as an active participant
in public affairs - together forming the public in public policy. It is again worth
quoting Lasch at length on this point:
Civic life requires settings in which people meet as equals, without regard
to race, class, national origins. Thanks to the decay of civic institutions
ranging from political parties to public parks and informal meeting places,
conversation has become almost as specialized as the production of
knowledge.19
In this portion of his argument, Lasch levies what is perhaps the best critique
of Rawls, namely that regardless of how deeply Rawls himself is allergic to
meritocracy, the Rawlsian rational actor has no real reason to share this allergy
given that he has no necessary social ties or obligations beyond the duty not to
impede others in the pursuit of their own happiness. In Lasch's description, Rawls'
liberalism "conceives of human beings as rootless abstractions wholly absorbed in
maximizing their own advantage," and within that system, there is "no room for
affective ties except in their most abstract form," (one loves humanity but not his
17
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neighbor.)20 Why should I, the Rawlsian actor, be forced to bump up against others
in civic life in circumstances and settings not of my choosing and liking? And why
should I share the bounties of my privilege as the difference principle bids me, with
people with whom I have no ties? And indeed this is the exact view that Lasch finds
explicitly advocated by Rawls' disciple Richard Rorty who writes in his own words
of a civil society that looks like "a bazaar surrounded by lots and lots of exclusive
private clubs," in which the only shared public forum is the marketplace, a society
in which all other forms of engagement take place in the insularity of self-chosen
enclaves.21
Thus, for all Rawls' insights, his central flaw is not recognizing that his ideal
mode of liberalism, if it is to avoid becoming a meritocracy, fully depends on preliberal sources of political identity. But precisely because his project (and much of
the neoliberal project) seeks to be self-sufficient without prescription of particular
civic virtues, it cannot acknowledge its predicament. Thus to draw from the words
of Lasch, "having abandoned the old republican ideal of citizenship along with the
republican indictment of luxury," these opportunity theorists in the neoliberal mold
lack "any grounds on which to appeal to individuals to subordinate private interest
to the public good."22
In short, the opportunity theorists' emphasis on mobility is myopic toward
the widespread political and economic devastation wrought by meritocracy, and the
neoliberal paradigm cannot exculpate itself from the pernicious consequences of
meritocracy without admitting the insufficiencies of the Rawlsian position. When
people are convinced that opportunity theory fails as a framework, they move
quickly toward outcome theory. As we will see, this leads us directly to a ballooning
administrative state that, however well it might lead to a more just distribution of
resources (and this is of course arguable), merely exacerbates the political
disenfranchisement of most citizens and further banishes much of the public from
public policy.

The Critique of Liberal Welfare and The Administrative State:
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we do have distinctly American ideals of civic republicanism, not least of which is Winthrop’s
famous sermon A Model of Christian Charity which provided much of the theoretical foundation
for Puritan civic life.
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Unlike market-infatuated neoliberals, progressives call for an increase in
government services and social safety nets funded by increased government
redistribution of wealth through higher taxes levied on the wealthy. However, when
pressed, few progressives can furnish evidence that the growing inflation of
government-as-administrative-state produces tangible results in reducing poverty
or healing the divisions (economic and social) created by the market efficiencies of
meritocracy. The progressives must instead argue that none of the previous four or
five or ten presidential administrations were daring enough, that if only we expand
government even more, then all the problems Lasch has outlined will finally be
resolved.
Lasch indicts the sliding goal posts that underpin this rhetoric, noting that
"if the reform movement gave us a society that bears little resemblance to what was
promised, we have to ask not whether the reform movement was insufficiently
liberal and humanitarian but whether liberal humanitarianism provides the best
recipe for a democratic society."23 In lieu of convincingly answering Lasch's
indictment, progressives are left to simply beg the question ad nauseum.
Nevertheless, let us assume for the sake of argument that the progressives
are right that an ever-expanding centralized administrative state is what is required
as the precondition for equality of outcome as the basis for a just society. We still
need to think about what effects such a state has on democracy and the public's role
in public affairs. Recall from the previous section that even Rawls—for as much as
he does not wish to prescribe any particular normative way of life—sees democratic
participation as a constitutive element of a fulfilled life, and not simply as a
mechanism for ensuring material benefit but more fundamentally as a pathway to
self-realization.
What is the effect of a growing administrative state on democratic
participation? Lasch surveys the origins of administrative government in the
reforms of 20th-century progressives like Woodrow Wilson who he sees as
operating from the position that "government was a science, not an art."24 For these
pioneers of government expansion, Lasch notes that public debate is a distraction
from the work of experts whose specialized education ensures they understand
policy questions better than the average Joe.25
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As the work of shaping policy is handed over to credentialed economists
and other social scientists, the role of the public becomes focused on the procedural
rather than the substantive, choosing the decision-makers rather than making
decisions. Lasch notes that the public, in this case, ordinary citizens in their capacity
as citizens, become increasingly "content to leave government to the experts," on
the condition that the experts satisfy their appetite for the "ever-increasing
abundance of comforts and conveniences so closely identified with the American
way of life."26 Likewise, so long as their various metrics of success in equity and
equality are met, opportunity and outcome theorists alike are content to let
governance become the domain of an elite few.27
Writing several decades before Lasch, Arendt anticipates his concerns while
providing an even more extensive argument against the shift to technocracy. She,
too, denounces as anti-democratic those modern bureaucratic states in which "all
political questions in the welfare state are ultimately problems of administration, to
be handled and decided by experts."28 She further notes that not even the "experts"
in this framework are genuine political actors engaged in statecraft. She writes, for
example, that elected representatives lack "an authentic area of action," and are
mere "administrative officers, whose business, though in the public interest, is not
essentially different from the business of private management."29
Arendt also identifies the sleight-of-hand in which citizens are taught to be
content with procedural participation rather than deliberative, active, and
substantive participation. She notes that we are increasingly left in a situation in
which people only share in public power at the ballot box on election day, with ever
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I should note as an aside that in Lasch’s view, The Right has no answer to this blossoming of
the administrative state either. He writes bitingly that “...we have heard a good deal of talk about
the repair of our material infrastructure, but our cultural infrastructure needs attention too,” and he
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Right seems to have to the problems of the administrative state is the inane proposal that it be
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from which we came.
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lessening "opportunity of being republicans and of acting as citizens."30 She writes
gloomily that "the most the citizen can be hoped for is to be 'represented', whereby
it is obvious that the only thing which can be represented and delegated is interest,
or the welfare of the constituents, but neither their actions nor their opinions."31
Indeed, it is worse than this, for while we might assume that citizens still retain
their opinions, Arendt maintains that they in fact do not, because "opinions are
formed in a process of open discussion and public debate," and where no such
public discussion exists, there are only political moods.32
Careful attention to this line argument should give a resounding answer to
the question regularly raised by the various consultants and strategists relied upon
by the DNC, particularly in the face of campaign defeats, "why do the masses vote
against their own interest?" Because even leaving unaddressed the assumption that
these strategists are in the best position to define public interest, it never seems to
occur to them that maybe Joe the Plumber wants to participate meaningfully in
defining political problems and crafting political solutions particularly in his local
community, rather than being spoon-fed policy proposals he had no say in by a
faraway elite he knows looks down on him.33 And to the extent that Joe and his
neighbors are pushed out of this political work, they are naturally susceptible to the
kinds of political moods that usher in demagogues that flatter them at exuberant
rallies (themselves a form of political participation worth taking just as seriously as
protests).

A Better Model, Equality of Participation:
Lasch puts matters bluntly: "democracy works best when men and women do things
for themselves, with the help of their friends and neighbors, instead of depending
on the state."34 By "works best," we are not talking about metrics like market
efficiency, but rather the citizenry's political health.
30
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This is not a particularly new insight. As Arendt notes, for the ancient
Greeks who invented democracy, freedom was something understood as being
manifest in human action, that "could appear and be real only when others saw
them, judged them, remembered them."35 Thus she notes that, contrary to Rawls'
vision of the sovereign individual who defines his own goods, "the life of a free
man needed the presence of others."36 More specifically, she notes that "freedom
itself needed...a place where people could come together - the agora, the marketplace, or the polis, the political space proper."37
Arendt sees this understanding of freedom as central to America's founding.
She writes that "Americans knew that public freedom consisted in having a share
in public business and that the activities connected with this business by no means
constituted a burden but gave those who discharged them in public a feeling of
happiness they could acquire nowhere else."38 As with the Greeks, this early
American conception of public freedom is significantly exterior and bound to space
and time; public happiness is what we enjoy together to a large extent through our
shared political deliberation and political action in public spaces.39
Arendt's central insight is that, unlike the French revolution which was
mostly fixated on disparities of wealth as the defining problem of the age, for the
American Founders, "the problem they posed was not social but political, it
concerned not the order of society but the form of government."40 Put another way,
rather than a social revolution premised on social mobility, America began as a
political revolution premised on political participation.41
.
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To briefly summarize all that has been hereto argued, no matter how
dutifully we facilitate upward mobility as the opportunity theorists demand or
redistribute resources as the outcome theorists demand, we will never ensure a
thriving democracy. Instead, in keeping with the insights of the Greeks and
American Founders, our focus needs to be on equality of participation as our
benchmark. In this framework, we will, as Lasch writes, "defend democracy not as
the most efficient but as the most educational form of government," a form of
political participation that "extends the circle of debate as widely as possible and
thus forces all citizens to articulate their views, to put their views at risk, and to
cultivate the virtues of eloquence, clarity of thought and expression, and sound
judgment."42

Conclusion: A Public Philosophy for the 21st Century
We are now ready to return to the nice white parents at the SIS school. My argument
all along has been that neither the opportunity nor the outcome theorists are of direct
help in analyzing the situation. Drawing from the three figures cited in this paper,
however, I hope we can now see that the primary problem with the foundation set
up by Hansen is that it bifurcates the school community, narrowing the scope of
"the public" involved in the public process of democratically governing the school
(including the notable task of selecting courses). We ought, therefore, to be critical
of this action even if full equality of opportunity and outcome were achieved
exclusively, or achieved with greater efficiency, through this means. Rather than
circumventing the public as it is constituted by participating parents, teachers,
students, and other key members of the community, Hansen should seek to work
within the community as a whole in discussion and collaboration with his fellow
citizens as together they chart a trajectory for the school.
Expanding outward, I have argued that neither the market nor the
administrative state are adequate replacements for a politically engaged citizenry
that deliberates together in public about public affairs and that acts together as an
expression of public freedom. Let me turn one final time to Lasch:
A public philosophy for the twenty-first century will have to give more
weight to the community than to the right of private decision. It will have
to emphasize responsibilities rather than rights. It will have to find a better
expression of the community than the welfare state. It will have to limit the
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scope of the market and the power of corporations without replacing them
with a centralized state bureaucracy."43
At the heart of Lasch' call for a public philosophy is the concept of the public. The
question of how we can restore the public to public policy is perhaps the greatest
question facing us as policy practitioners today. And so while I’ve written this to a
professional audience, I do not wish for this discourse to be contained within the
boundaries of the credentialed discipline. It is time to engage the fullest imaginable
public directly in the discussion of public affairs which equally concerns each of us
as citizens in our shared pursuit of public freedom.
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